Analogy-Based Abrogation and Its Impact on Usūlī Principles and Jurisprudential Applications

Abstract

Abstract:

Abrogation is a pivotal subject in Islamic legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh), receiving significant scholarly attention due to its profound implications for legal reasoning and its necessity before deriving rulings. One of the debated issues within this domain is the concept of abrogation through analogy (qiyās). Scholars have long disputed its validity, and this disagreement has had tangible consequences for both foundational legal principles and practical rulings in Islamic jurisprudence.

In this study, I examine the concept in depth—beginning with definitions of its key terms: naskh (abrogation) and qiyās (analogy). I then present the differing opinions of uṣūl scholars on the permissibility of this form of abrogation, analyzing the major arguments and counterarguments for each position. The paper proceeds to identify the legal and jurisprudential issues influenced by this debate, highlighting how and why scholars diverged on this matter. The conclusion outlines the key findings and insights drawn from the research.